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liquidity for a given stock to be negatively related to the attention requirements of other stocks in his portfolio, all else constant. We refer to this as the Limited Attention Hypothesis.
The Limited Attention Hypothesis is based on the assumption that individual specialists face time and processing constraints that limit their ability to monitor and process multiple orders simultaneously, particularly during busy trading periods. While limited specialist attention can affect all stocks, we expect the effects to be most evident for inactive securities for two reasons. First, specialists participate in a larger fraction of trades and provide a greater proportion of liquidity for inactive securities (see Madhavan and Sofianos (1998)). As a result, changes in specialist participation should be most apparent for these securities. Second, cost-benefit models of attention allocation suggest that agents will allocate attention in a manner that maximizes their total utility. 4 Since specialists put more capital at risk when trading the most active stocks and derive a large fraction of their profits from these stocks (see Sofianos (1995) and
Coughenour and Harris (2005)), we argue that they are less likely to divert attention from these securities.
We test the Limited Attention Hypothesis using intraday transaction data from TAQ combined with trading floor location data from the NYSE's specialist directories. Results from pooled time-series and cross-sectional regressions indicate that the rate and magnitude of price improvement decrease and bid-ask spreads increase as the specialist's attention to other stocks at the trading panel increases. These results hold after controlling for the stock's own trading activity and return volatility, for firm fixed effects, for time-of-day effects, and for market-wide variation in liquidity and attention. Further tests indicate that the effects of limited attention are most evident for the least active stocks and are robust to alternative specifications and econometric techniques. Together, our results indicate that limited attention has a significant impact on liquidity provision in financial markets.
Our evidence is particularly notable given that several NYSE characteristics work to reduce the effects of limited attention. NYSE specialists are highly regulated and their performance with respect to liquidity provision is closely monitored. As a result, they have incentives to avoid attention problems.
During unusually busy periods, specialists can increase capacity by calling on "relief specialists" or additional clerks. In addition, specialist firms appear to allocate stocks to trading panels in a manner that reflects attention limits. The most active stocks generally trade apart from one another and with fewer other securities, allowing specialists to maximize the attention paid to these stocks. Together, these factors may mitigate the potential effects of an individual specialist's limited attention. Nevertheless, we document a significant relation between limited attention and liquidity provision.
Our empirical work is related to three recent studies of individual specialist portfolios. Battalio, Ellul, and Jennings (2007) examine time-series changes in transaction costs, focusing specifically on changes in floor location. They find that specialists form cost-reducing relationships with floor brokers and that these relationships take time to develop following a reorganization of the trading floor. Our results provide additional evidence that the location of a security on the trading floor can influence liquidity provision. In cross-sectional analyses, Huang and Liu (2004) find that NYSE specialists subsidize the illiquid stocks in their portfolio and Boulatov, Hatch, Johnson, and Lei (2007) find that quote adjustment speeds depend upon the prominence of the stock within the specialist's portfolio. While our evidence is generally consistent with these two studies, we note that cross-sectional analyses of limited attention are difficult to interpret given the endogenous relation between stock characteristics and specialist portfolios. In contrast, our study focuses on the time-series covariation between liquidity provision and the activity of other stocks handled by the same specialist. This allows us to minimize the aforementioned endogeneity problem and to directly test whether variation in attention affects the specialist's ability to provide liquidity.
Although prior studies suggest that limited attention may influence investors' demand for liquidity in financial markets, our study provides the first direct evidence that limited attention influences the supply of liquidity. Specifically, we find that liquidity provision is significantly affected by the limited attention of market makers and the resulting allocation of effort across securities. These findings point to a potential but unexplored benefit of recent NYSE initiatives to automate a larger fraction of trading.
Increased automation of trade executions may reduce capacity constraints and allow specialists to focus on those trades for which they add the most value. However, our analysis does not permit us to draw conclusions about the optimality of alternative market structures or to determine whether a reduction in capacity constraints would result in lower transaction costs for the overall market. We argue only that market maker attention is limited and that the resulting effects are significant enough to be considered along with other costs and benefits of market design. While our tests are based on data from the NYSE, our findings may apply to other markets where dealers allocate attention across multiple securities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I we discuss related literature and develop our main hypothesis. Section II describes the data and sample characteristics. In Section III we provide the main empirical tests of the Limited Attention Hypothesis. Section IV describes additional tests and robustness checks and Section V concludes.
I. Background and Motivation

A. The NYSE Trading Floor and the Role of the Specialist
Each security traded on the NYSE is handled by a single specialist who is responsible for making a "fair and orderly market" in the security. However, individual specialists are typically responsible for making markets in multiple securities. As of August 2002, there were seven active specialist firms on the NYSE trading at 19 trading posts and 357 trading panels. The number of securities traded at an individual specialist panel (including common and preferred stocks, warrants, trusts, and other structured products)
ranged from one to 63. Throughout the paper, we refer to the stocks at a single panel as an individual specialist portfolio. 5 The decision of assigning a security to an individual specialist involves input from the listing firm, the specialist firm, and the Exchange. Initially, stocks are allocated to specialist firms in accordance with the Exchange's Allocation Policy and Procedures (see Corwin (2004) ). During this process, the specialist firm identifies the individual specialist who will be assigned to the stock. Once allocated, reassignments of stocks across specialist firms are rare. 6 However, reassignments of stocks within a specialist firm are relatively common and specialist firms have some flexibility in how they organize stocks across trading panels. Corwin (2004) finds that stock allocations to NYSE specialist firms reflect both performance and nonperformance variables. Notably, since specialist performance influences future stock allocations, specialists may be unwilling to set unusually wide quotes or to avoid participation in the trading process for extended periods of time.
B. Market Making and the Limited Attention Hypothesis
A NYSE specialist can affect liquidity in several ways. First, the specialist is responsible for posting bid and ask quotes. At their discretion, the specialist can choose to either post quotes that reflect the liquidity in the limited order book or add liquidity by posting quotes that improve upon the limit book price or depth. Traditional microstructure models suggest that a market maker will set bid and ask quotes conditional on their level of inventory risk and the probability of informed trade. 7 In addition, models of limit order markets suggest that limit book dynamics will depend on order arrival rates and the patience of traders (see Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2005) and Rosu (2006)). Notably, none of these models account for the possibility that individual specialists may be subject to limited attention.
The specialist also has significant influence on liquidity through their role in executing trades at prices better than the quotes. As described by Petersen and Fialkowski (1994), the specialist can generally accomplish this in two ways. First, the specialist can "stop" a market order, guaranteeing a price at least as good as the current quote. The specialist then attempts to fill the order at an improved price by matching it with a subsequent incoming order. At worst, the stopped order will be executed at the guaranteed price. Second, the specialist can participate in the trade directly by purchasing or selling from their own inventory at a price better than the posted quotes. Both cases require specialist attention, though only the second involves the direct participation of the specialist in the trade.
If specialists face attention limits, they may not be able to continuously incorporate information or act as a source of liquidity for all securities in their portfolio. During busy periods, specialists may be forced to allocate effort across the securities in their portfolio. If a specialist reduces the attention paid to a particular security, it is likely to affect liquidity in two ways. First, the specialist is likely to minimize their inventory and adverse selection risks by reducing or eliminating their participation in the posted bidask quotes. Second, a specialist facing binding attention limits will be less able to improve liquidity by participating in trades inside the quotes or by stopping orders. Together, these arguments suggest that the specialist's ability to provide liquidity will be negatively related to the attention requirements of other stocks in his portfolio. We refer to this as the Limited Attention Hypothesis.
What factors determine how a specialist allocates effort? Given the intuition in Peng (2005), we expect a constrained specialist to allocate effort toward those stocks that have the greatest impact on his utility. In particular, we expect specialists to focus on those stocks that have the largest influence on their portfolio profits and risk. Given that specialists place the most capital at risk when trading the largest, most active securities, it is reasonable to expect that these securities have the greatest impact on specialist risk. In addition, the largest, most active securities account for the vast majority of specialist profits. For example, Coughenour and Harris (2005) find that roughly 82% of combined specialist revenue is derived from the 100 most active NYSE stocks. Thus, both profit and risk considerations suggest that specialists will allocate their attention toward the largest, most active stocks in their portfolio.
If specialists allocate attention toward the largest, most active securities, the attention devoted to the less active securities in their portfolio must be reduced. This suggests that the effects of limited attention should be most evident for small, inactive securities. The effects of limited attention may also have a greater impact on inactive securities because specialists provide a larger fraction of liquidity for these securities. Madhavan and Sofianos (1998), for example, report that specialists participate in 54% of share volume in the least active decile of NYSE stocks, compared to only 15% in the most active decile.
Since small, inactive securities rely more on the specialist to supply liquidity, transaction costs for these securities will be tied more directly to specialist actions. In contrast, transaction costs for active stocks are more likely to reflect the actions of other traders and the liquidity in the limit order book.
II. Data and Sample Characteristics
To analyze the effects of limited attention within specialist portfolios, we must identify the NYSE To refine the sample, we combine the Specialist Directory data with additional information from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We start by identifying the sample of securities included in both CRSP and the NYSE Specialist Directory for the full sample period from August 1 through October 31, 2002. This provides an initial sample of 2,515 securities. We then restrict the sample to common stocks and ADRs (CRSP share code equal to 10, 11, 12, 30, or 31) . This reduces the sample to 1,920 securities. Throughout the rest of the paper, we refer to these 1,920 securities as the "full sample,"
and we use this sample to define the characteristics of individual specialist portfolios.
For all liquidity analyses, we focus on the subset of stocks that meet an additional set of price and trading restrictions. We remove stocks that experience a stock split during the sample period, stocks with an average transaction price during the sample period of less than $3 or more than $200, stocks with an average transaction price during any 30-minute period of less than $2, and stocks that trade in fewer than 800 of the 840 30-minute trading periods. These restrictions reduce the sample by 14, 125, 14, and 496 securities, respectively. 8 We also remove 19 securities that either trade alone at a panel or have panel attention, as defined below, equal to zero for more than 26 periods. The restricted sample used in the regression analysis includes 1,252 NYSE-listed common stocks and ADRs.
For each security in the restricted sample, we estimate measures of price improvement and execution costs at 30-minute intervals based on intraday trade and quote data from the NYSE's TAQ database. We define all liquidity and attention measures using only NYSE trades and quotes. 9 For each transaction, let t denote transaction time, p denote transaction price, a denote the ask price, b denote the bid price, and m denote the bid-ask midpoint. To measure transaction costs, we define the quoted spread (qs t ) as a t -b t , the percentage quoted spread (pqs t ) as 100·qs t /m t , the effective spread (es t ) as 2⏐p t -m t ⏐, and the percentage effective spread (pes t ) as 100·es t /m t . We then aggregate by taking a trade-weighted average across all trades during the 30-minute period.
Our hypothesis is motivated by the direct involvement of the specialist in the trading process.
Although spreads are affected by the actions of the specialist, they may also be influenced by the placement of limit orders and the actions of other traders. To provide a more direct measure of the specialist's involvement in the trading process, we focus on trades that execute inside the quotes (or priceimproved trades After excluding funds, REITs, units, trusts, and other structured products, we find that common stocks and ADRs trade at 331 different panels, with an average panel size of 5.8 stocks. Notably, the reduction in number of panels relative to the full specialist directory suggests that 26 panels trade no common stocks or ADRs. The largest panel now includes 21 common stocks and there are 11 securities traded at panels with no other common stocks. Of the 1,920 common stocks and ADRs in the sample, 17.6% change posts and 31.5% change panels at some point during the sample period.
The full distribution of panel size is illustrated in more detail in Figure 1 . As suggested in Table   II The evidence in Table III is consistent with the hypothesis that specialist firms tend to place their most actively traded securities at smaller panels. We conclude that the observed allocation of stocks to panels provides prima facie evidence that specialist firms recognize the marginal costs associated with limited attention and effort allocation. In the following sections, we consider the significance of these costs in light of the fact that they may be reduced by the allocation decisions of specialist firms.
III. Empirical Tests for Limited Attention and Effort Allocation
In this section we present our empirical tests for limited attention and effort allocation in securities trading. To begin, we define the three attention measures used throughout our tests. We then present our primary tests based on pooled time-series and cross-sectional regressions. In Section IV, we provide additional analyses and robustness checks using both pooled regressions and firm-specific timeseries regressions.
A. The Measurement of Specialist Attention
The effectiveness of our tests rests on our ability to measure how a specialist allocates attention across the stocks at his panel. To begin, we assert that the attention required for a given stock increases with the number of transactions and the absolute return during the period. For each stock, we define three estimates of required specialist attention. Our first measure is based on the number of transactions during a given trading period. Although this measure has the advantage of simplicity, it ignores the possibility that factors other than trade frequency may affect the required level of specialist attention.
To address this concern, we define a second measure based on the absolute return during the period and a third measure that incorporates both the trade frequency and absolute return during the period. One drawback of the third measure is that it requires an assumption about the relative importance of trades and absolute returns in determining specialist attention requirements. To minimize the inherent subjectivity in this measure, we standardize both trade frequency and absolute return by their respective standard deviations computed across all observations in the pooled data. By doing so, we implicitly assume that a period with trade frequency that is one standard deviation above zero requires the same level of specialist attention as a period with absolute return that is one standard deviation above zero. For stock i and period t, our attention measures are defined formally as
where trdfreq i,t is the number of trades for stock i during period t, σ trdfreq is the standard deviation of trade frequency across all stock-periods, |bpret| i,t is the absolute return in basis points for stock i during period t, Even among the least active securities in the sample, there is significant variation in average absolute return. As a result, we expect the three attention measures to provide correlated but different information.
We report summary statistics for the attention measures in Table IV Table IV reports summary statistics for these measures. The statistics indicate that smaller, less active stocks have higher panel attention measures. This is consistent with less active stocks being traded on larger panels.
Conversely, the most active stocks have the lowest levels of panel attention, reflecting the tendency to place active securities on smaller panels.
To examine more directly whether the NYSE and specialist firms consider limited attention when assigning stocks to panels, we compare the cross-sectional distribution of panel attention using the actual NYSE stock assignments to the distribution that results from a random assignment of stocks to panels.
We begin by assigning stocks randomly to panels while maintaining the actual distribution of panel sizes (as illustrated in Figure 1 ). Based on these stock assignments, we estimate panel attention measures for each panel each period and calculate the cross-sectional standard deviation of panel attention each period.
We then calculate the average cross-sectional standard deviation across all time periods. We repeat this process 1,000 times. For the panel attention measures that incorporate trading activity (Attention 1 and Attention 3 ), the actual NYSE panel assignments result in a lower cross-sectional standard deviation than any of the 1,000 random allocations (a p-value of <0.001). This suggests that stocks are indeed assigned to panels in a manner that minimizes variation in attention across panels. For the attention measure based solely on returns (Attention 2 ), the p-value relative to the random allocations is 0.687. This result is not surprising given the difficulty in predicting returns.
To assess the differences in the three panel attention measures, we estimate their time-series correlation for each stock. The cross-sectional means of these correlations are reported in the last three 
where for each stock i, AbsReturn it is the absolute midpoint-to-midpoint return during period t, InvPrice it is the inverse of the average trade price during period t, LogTrades it is the natural log of one plus the number of trades during period t, and LogTradeSize it is the natural log of one plus the average trade size during period t. To control for intraday patterns in transaction costs we also include dummy variables (HH p ) to identify the 13 half-hour trading periods from 9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.
We provide several specifications using both continuous and discrete measures of panel attention.
As continuous measures, we include the natural log of one plus each panel attention measure. As discrete measures, we define dummy variables to identify periods of unusually high and low panel attention. 14 The dependent variables include the rate of price improvement, the dollar and percentage magnitude of price improvement, and the percentage effective spread. 15 If the specialist decreases his participation in trading when other stocks at the panel require increasingly more attention, we expect the coefficients on LogPanelAttention and BusyPanel to be negative and the coefficient on SlowPanel to be positive in the price improvement regressions. Since the probability of price improvement is increasing in the width of the spread, we follow Petersen and Fialkowski (1994) by including the quoted spread as an additional explanatory variable in the price improvement regressions. This allows us to focus on variation in price improvement that is unrelated to variation in the quoted spread and the related placement of limit orders.
For the effective spread regressions, the expected signs on our key variables are the opposite. If transaction costs increase during periods of high panel attention, we expect the coefficients on BusyPanel and LogPanelAttention to be positive in the spread regressions. In addition, if the specialist is able to provide additional liquidity during periods when panel attention requirements are low, we expect the coefficient on SlowPanel to be negative in the spread regressions.
Given the pooled nature of the data, we expect the error terms in the model to include a securityspecific component. To account for this, the model is estimated including one-way fixed effects. We assume that the error terms follow the structure
, where v i is a firm-specific fixed effect and u it is the classical zero-mean error term. 16 The regression results are provided in Table V . Models including the discrete measures of panel attention are described in Panel A. All control variables have the expected signs and the restrictions that firm fixed effects and time-of-day effects equal zero are easily rejected in all specifications. More importantly, both the BusyPanel and SlowPanel coefficients are significant and of the correct sign in the price improvement models, regardless of the measure of panel attention. The coefficients show that the rate and magnitude of price improvement decrease (increase) when the attention required by other stocks on the panel is unusually high (low). These results suggest that the specialist's ability to provide liquidity is negatively related to the attention requirements of other stocks at the panel, even after controlling for own-stock trading activity. In addition, the effects of panel attention are evident not only when attention requirements are unusually high, but also when attention requirements are unusually low.
[INSERT TABLE V HERE]
The results based on effective spreads provide similar conclusions. The coefficient on BusyPanel is positive and significant for two of the three attention measures and the coefficient on SlowPanel is negative and significant for all three attention measures. These results suggest that transaction costs increase as the specialist allocates attention toward other securities at the same panel. Table V presents To examine the economic impact of limited attention, we estimate the predicted values of the price improvement rate and percentage effective spread based on the regression coefficients in Table V and the mean values of all explanatory variables. We also include the median firm fixed effect and the dummy variable for intraday period 6 (12:30-1:00). In the regressions based on PanelAttention 1 (perhaps through the use of automatic execution systems) could be large.
Panel B of
C. Controls for Market-Wide Effects
The regressions reported above control for variation in own-stock characteristics that may affect price improvement and execution costs. However, the results may also reflect a correlation between individual security liquidity and market-wide effects. To control for this possibility, we extend the In the first stage, we remove systematic liquidity components using stock-specific time-series OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is either a price improvement measure or the percentage effective spread and the explanatory variable is the corresponding market liquidity measure. The residuals from this regression reflect variation in stock liquidity that is unexplained by variation in market-wide liquidity. In the second stage, we use these residuals as the dependent variable in pooled regressions similar to equation (4), where the corresponding market attention measures are added as explanatory variables. This two-stage procedure is used throughout Tables VI to VIII to control for market-wide liquidity and attention effects.
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The results from the second-stage regression are reported in Table VI , Panel A. 18 The results for both the rate and magnitude of price improvement provide strong evidence in support of the Limited Attention Hypothesis. The coefficient on PanelAttention 1 is negative and significant in every price improvement regression and the coefficient on PanelAttention 3 is negative and significant in all specifications in which it is included. Again, the coefficient on PanelAttention 2 tends to be negative, but loses significance when included with PanelAttention 3 . Overall, we conclude that both the magnitude and rate of price improvement are significantly affected by the attention requirements of the other stocks handled by the specialist, even after controlling for market-wide effects.
[
INSERT TABLE VI HERE]
The results for effective spreads are mixed. The panel attention coefficients are insignificant in the first two specifications. In the third specification, the coefficient is positive and significant for PanelAttention 1 and PanelAttention 2 , but negative and significant for PanelAttention 3 . Thus, while panel attention requirements have strong effects on price improvement, the net effect on execution costs is difficult to determine. However, in subsequent analyses, the effective spread evidence supports the Limited Attention Hypothesis. We discuss these results in more detail below.
D. Expected vs. Unexpected Attention Requirements
The evidence in Table III suggests that panel assignments by NYSE specialist firms work to reduce the effects of limited attention. Specifically, stocks expected to require high levels of attention are assigned to small panels, while stocks with low expected attention requirements are assigned to larger panels. If total expected attention requirements differ across panels and the ability to handle extreme attention requirements is a skill that differs across specialists, we would also expect the most skilled specialists to be assigned to the busiest panels. These arguments suggest that it may be variation in unexpected rather than total attention requirements that drive differences in liquidity provision.
To test this hypothesis, we define the unexpected component of each panel attention measure. To begin, we calculate Attention 1 , Attention 2 , and Attention 3 for each stock-period during the three-month pre-sample period from May through June, 2002. These pre-sample attention measures are defined as in equations (1) interest, and then demeaning the resulting variable to remove cross-stock differences in the level of unexpected panel attention. 19 We also define the corresponding unexpected market attention measures using the same procedure and the set of all stocks not traded at the same panel as the stock of interest.
Throughout the remaining analyses, we provide results for both total and unexpected panel attention. The conclusions are generally insensitive to the attention measure used.
Results from pooled regressions based on unexpected panel attention are provided in Table VI Table VI provide strong evidence that the attention requirements of the specialist have a significant effect on both the rate and magnitude of price improvement, even after controlling for market-wide effects. However, the results for effective spreads would seem to suggest that these price improvement effects may not translate into higher effective spreads. In additional tests to follow, we find that the negative relation between effective spreads and panel attention is driven primarily by the subsample of active securities and periods of high own-trading activity. In fact, evidence from the individual security time-series regressions described in Section IV below provides strong support for a positive relation between effective spreads and panel attention, consistent with the Limited Attention Hypothesis.
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IV. Additional Tests and Robustness Checks
In this section, we provide several additional tests to refine the analysis and test for robustness.
First, we test whether the overall results are stronger in the subsample of inactive securities, where limited attention effects should be most pronounced. Second, we extend our pooled regressions to examine the relation between liquidity provision and panel attention when own-stock trading activity is within normal bounds. Finally, we provide an alternative test of the Limited Attention Hypothesis using stock-specific OLS time-series regressions.
A. Active vs. Inactive Securities
As discussed above, we expect the effects of limited attention to be most evident for the least active securities. To examine this hypothesis directly, we allow the coefficients on panel attention to differ across active and inactive stocks. For the purposes of this regression, we define Active stocks as the 500 most active stocks in our sample (the high-and mid-activity groups). The remaining stocks (the lowactivity group) are defined as Inactive. To aid with interpretation, we include interactions for only one panel attention measure at a time. All regressions include the full set of control variables described in Section III.B, as well as the market liquidity and market attention variables described in Section III.C. To conserve space, the coefficients on these control variables are not reported.
We report the coefficients on panel attention variables for active and inactive securities in Table VII are consistent with our hypothesis that the effects of limited attention are most prominent for the least active NYSE stocks.
B. Controlling for Own-Stock Trading Activity
An important consideration in our tests is the potential correlation in order flow across stocks. For example, Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) report strong positive covariation in order flow across the 30 stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average. To isolate the effects of limited attention, we must be careful to control for the effects of own-stock trading activity. The interaction between own-stock trading activity and panel activity may also reveal something about the trading environment. For example, periods when own-stock activity is high but panel activity is low (or normal) may reflect significant firm-specific events. During these periods, spreads are likely to vary for reasons unrelated to limited attention effects.
Throughout the previous regressions, we control for own-stock trading activity by including ownstock trading characteristics as explanatory variables. In this section, we provide an additional test to control for own-stock trading. Specifically, we allow the effects of panel attention to differ across periods when own-stock trading is low, normal, or high. We expect periods of normal own-trading activity to provide the cleanest test of the Limited Attention Hypothesis.
To isolate periods of normal own-trading activity, we create three indicator variables that describe the level of each stock's trading activity in a given period relative to its own time-series mean and standard deviation. Specifically, we set OwnHigh (OwnLow) equal to one when a stock's trade frequency in a given period is more than one standard deviation above (below) its time-series mean. All other periods are defined as Normal. Using these indicator variables we modify our pooled regressions to allow the coefficient on panel attention to vary with own-stock trading activity. Again, to aid with interpretation, we include interactions for only one panel attention variable at a time.
The results, presented in Table VIII, Table VI may be due in part to high own-trading periods.
INSERT TABLE VIII HERE]
C. Stock-Specific Time-Series Regressions
Although the pooled analysis should minimize the potential endogeneity bias associated with NYSE stock allocation decisions, these effects may not be eliminated. As an additional check, we provide a robustness test of the Limited Attention Hypothesis using stock-specific time-series regressions. These OLS regressions eliminate cross-security effects and focus solely on the time-series relation between panel attention and liquidity provision.
To test the Limited Attention Hypothesis in this setting, we examine the cross-sectional distribution of the time-series regression coefficients. This is similar to the methodology used by Chordia et al. (2000) . The results are reported in Table IX Overall, the results in Table IX provide strong evidence that both the magnitude and rate of price improvement decrease and execution costs increase as the attention required by other stocks at the same panel increases. These results also suggest that our pooled evidence is robust to potential endogeneity concerns and to alternative estimation methods. Together with the results from Tables V through VIII, these findings indicate that the specialist's ability to provide liquidity is significantly affected by limited attention and the allocation of effort across securities.
V. Summary and Conclusions
It is well known that human beings are limited in their ability to process information and to perform multiple tasks simultaneously (see Kahneman (1973) and Pashler (1998) for reviews). Despite This study provides the first direct evidence that limited attention influences the provision of liquidity in financial markets. Since individual NYSE specialists are assigned a well-defined set of securities, this setting provides an ideal framework for analyzing the allocation of limited attention across securities. We show that the specialist's ability to provide liquidity for a particular stock is significantly affected by the attention requirements of other securities traded at the same location. Consistent with the Limited Attention Hypothesis, our evidence indicates that market makers face attention limits and they allocate their effort across securities during periods when attention constraints are binding. In the process, their ability to act as an important source of liquidity is reduced for at least a subset of the securities in their market making portfolio. Therefore, while the design of the NYSE may yield diversification and/or subsidization benefits by allowing specialists to handle a portfolio of stocks, our paper identifies potential costs associated with this organizational arrangement.
It is important to note that we do not argue that specialists actively impair liquidity during periods when panel attention requirements are high. Instead, it is likely that the specialist is unable to act as an additional source of liquidity during these periods, leaving spreads to be determined primarily by the actions of other traders. During normal conditions, the specialist steps in to facilitate trade and to act as an important source of liquidity. During busy periods, however, the specialist's ability to provide this service is limited.
This research has important implications for future theoretical work considering the influence of limited attention on trading. While prior studies suggest that limited attention may affect the demand for securities, we show that attention limits may also influence prices through the supply of liquidity. Our paper also has implications for the allocation of stocks on the trading floor and contributes to the ongoing debate over the merits of floor-based versus electronic trading. In particular, increased automation, such as that currently being implemented on the NYSE, may relieve specialist capacity constraints and reduce the necessity to allocate effort across stocks. While our tests are based on NYSE data our findings may be applicable to any market in which dealer effort is allocated across multiple securities. Table II Panel Characteristics
The table provides specialist panel characteristics from the NYSE trading floor as of August 1, 2002 . In the first row, panel size is defined based on the full set of 3,599 securities listed in the NYSE Specialist Directory. In row two, panel size is defined based on the set of 1,920 common stocks and ADRs with available CRSP data. In row three, panel size is defined based on the final restricted sample of 1,252 stocks. All securities in the final sample meet the following restrictions: (1) included in both CRSP and the NYSE Specialist Directory for the entire sample period, (2) no stock splits during the sample period, (3) an average transaction price greater than $3 and less than $200, (4) a minimum transaction price greater than $2, and (5) The table provides average panel size and trading characteristics for the restricted sample of 1,252 common stocks and ADRs listed on the NYSE from August 1 through October 31, 2002. All securities meet the following restrictions: (1) included in both CRSP and the NYSE Specialist Directory for the entire sample period, (2) no stock splits during the sample period, (3) an average transaction price greater than $3 and less than $200, (4) a minimum transaction price greater than $2, and (5) at least one trade in 800 of the 840 available 30-minute trading periods. For each security, panel and trading characteristics are averaged across all intraday trading periods and we report the cross-sectional average of these individual stock means. Sample stocks are divided into three categories based on the average daily number of trades during the pre-sample period from May through July, 2002: the 100 most active stocks, the next 400 stocks, and the least active 752 stocks. Means are reported separately for each category. In the first row, panel size is defined based on the full set of 3,599 securities listed in the August 1 st NYSE Specialist Directory. In rows two through five, panel size, panel rank, and market share are defined based on the sample of 1,920 common stocks and ADRs with available CRSP data. The p-value is from a test of the restriction that means are equal across trade activity categories, based on analysis of variance.
Trade Activity Category: High Activity (N=100)
Mid Activity (N=400) 
Measures of Attention Required by a Specialist
The table provides summary statistics for three alternative measures of specialist attention based on standardized trade frequency and standardized absolute return. For each stock and each 30-minute period, trade frequency is defined as the number of trades and absolute return is defined as the absolute value of the midpoint-to-midpoint return during the period. Both variables are then standardized by their respective standard deviation calculated across all pooled time-series and cross-sectional observations. Attention 1 is equal to the standardized trade frequency. Attention 2 is equal to the standardized absolute return. The table reports Table V and we use three alternative measures of PanelAttention as defined in Table IV . For brevity, we do not report the coefficients on the control variables, as they do not change substantially from those reported on Table V . Panel attention is further separated into expected and unexpected components as described in Section III.D. Results for total panel attention are provided in Panel A and results for unexpected panel attention are provided in Panel B. We control for both market-wide liquidity and market-wide attention effects using a two-stage regression procedure. In the first stage, we remove systematic liquidity effects by regressing each dependent variable on a corresponding market measure, defined as the equally-weighted average of the variable across all stocks that are not traded at the same panel. The residuals from the first stage are then used as the dependent variable in a second-stage pooled regression which follows the specification from Table V Table V and we use three alternative measures of PanelAttention as defined in Table IV . For brevity, we do not report the coefficients on the control variables, as they do not change substantially from those reported on Table V . Panel attention is further separated into expected and unexpected attention as described in Section III.D. Results for total panel attention are provided in Panel A and results for unexpected panel attention are provided in Panel B. We control for both market-wide liquidity and market-wide attention effects using a two-stage regression procedure. In the first stage, we remove systematic liquidity effects by regressing each dependent variable on a corresponding market measure, defined as the equally-weighted average of the variable across all stocks that are not traded at the same panel. The residuals from the first stage are then used as the dependent variable in a second-stage pooled regression which follows the specification from Table V and also controls for market attention, defined as the sum of individual stock attention across all stocks not traded at the same panel. All models also include firm fixed effects and time-of-day effects. p-values are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. In addition, we report an F-test of the restriction that the coefficient on panel attention is equal across trade activity categories. The table reports coefficient estimates from pooled time-series and cross-section regressions of price improvement and transaction costs on measures of panel attention, allowing both the intercept and the slope on panel attention to differ based on the level of own-stock trading activity. To classify own-stock trading activity, we estimate the time-series mean and standard deviation of the number of trades for each stock. Periods of Low (High) own trading are then defined as periods where trading activity is more than one standard deviation below (above) the stock-specific mean. All other periods are defined as Normal. The model includes 1,252 firms and 840 30-minute trading periods from August 1 through October 31, 2002. The dependent and independent variables are defined in Table V and we use three alternative measures of PanelAttention as defined in Table IV . For brevity, we do not report the coefficients on the control variables, as they do not change substantially from those reported on Table V . Panel attention is further separated into expected and unexpected components as described in Section III.D. Results for total panel attention are provided in Panel A and results for unexpected panel attention are provided in Panel B. We control for both market-wide liquidity and market-wide attention effects using a two-stage regression procedure. In the first stage, we remove systematic liquidity effects by regressing each dependent variable on a corresponding market measure, defined as the equally-weighted average of the variable across all stocks that are not traded at the same panel. The residuals from the first stage are then used as the dependent variable in a second-stage pooled regression which follows the specification from Table V Table V and we use three alternative measures of PanelAttention as defined in Table IV . For brevity, we do not report the coefficients on the control variables, as they do not change substantially from those reported on Table V . Panel attention is further separated into expected and unexpected components as described in Section III.D. The models also control for both market-wide liquidity and market-wide attention effects, where market liquidity is defined as the equally-weighted average of the dependent variable across all stocks that are not traded at the same panel and market attention is defined as the sum of individual stock attention across all stocks not traded at the same panel. The table reports the median coefficient across the 1,252 sample stocks, as well as a p-value from the sign test of the hypothesis that the cross-section median is zero (in parentheses) and the percentage of coefficients that have the correct sign (in brackets). Panels A and B replicate the pooled regressions in Table V Attention 3 as the square root of (standardized trade frequency × standardized absolute return).
14 We include the latter restriction because, due to the nature of the stocks at the panel, some panels may always be active or inactive relative to other panels on the NYSE trading floor. Results are qualitatively similar if we define busy and slow periods using only (i). Based on the combined restrictions, 6.65% (6.04%) of total stock-period observations are classified as busy (slow) based on PanelAttention 1 and 8.64% (8.01%) of observations are classified as busy (slow) based on PanelAttention 2 . 15 We report evidence throughout the paper based on the percentage effective spread. We also perform tests based on the dollar quoted spread, the percentage quoted spread, and the dollar effective spread. Conclusions based on these alternative measures are similar.
conserve space, these coefficients are not reported. 19 Demeaning panel attention removes cross-stock differences in the level of panel attention, allowing us to focus on time-series effects. The conclusions are generally similar if we do not demean panel attention. Unlike total panel attention, unexpected panel attention can be either positive or negative. As a result, we do not use a log specification for unexpected panel attention. To remove the effects of extreme outliers, we winsorize unexpected attention at the 0.1 and 99.9 percentiles. The conclusions are generally unchanged if we winsorize at alternative levels. 20 Our panel attention measures are, by definition, highly correlated with market activity. To address this issue, we repeat the analysis using a market spread estimate that is not constructed from our dependent or independent variables. Specifically, we use the trade-weighted average spread on the SPDR (S&P500) exchange traded fund.
These regressions provide support for the Limited Attention Hypothesis.
